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NOTE: AN EVALUATION OF THE 
EFFECTS OF THE LEGALIZATION OF 
MARIJUANA IN COLORADO AND 
WASHINGTON FROM AN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 
Aparna Bushan* 
I. OVERVIEW 
The legalization of marijuana in the states of Colorado and Washington has 
raised issues that the international community has not previously been forced to 
consider. Through examining relevant state laws, current federal legislation and 
applicable international agreements, this Note will outline the legal ramifications 
that the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington could have both 
nationally and internationally. This Note will further evaluate all reasonable 
alternatives available to the United States in meeting the requirements mandated 
of it by the international agreements it is party to. 
Main Issue 
The United States’ national legislation is currently in conflict with the 
international agreements it is party to. From a purely national perspective, the 
federal legislation governing the United States has numerous discrepancies with 
the recent laws in Colorado and Washington State regarding the usage of 
recreational marijuana.1 These discrepancies in national and state law in turn 
have resulted in international consequences. As a party to various international 
conventions that govern the use of marijuana, the United States has contravened 
several convention provisions by allowing for the possession of marijuana. The 
legalization of marijuana in two states now requires the United States to justify 
its actions internationally in order to remain party to the affected international 
agreements.2 Essentially, the conflict between state and federal law has resulted 
in a divergence between the United States and the international agreements it is 
committed to. 
 
* H.B.A. (Richard Ivey School of Business, University of Western Ontario, 2015); J.D. 
(University of Western Ontario, 2015); Student-at-Law, Harrison Pensa LLP, London, 
Ontario. 
  1 See A Liberal Drift, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 10, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/
united-states/21565972-local-votes-suggest-more-tolerant-countrybut-not-more-left-wing-one-
liberal-drift (positing that divergence in state law and federal law regarding the legalization of 
medical marijuana in California may “spell trouble”) [hereinafter A Liberal Drift]. See also 
Marijuana Resource Center: State Laws Related to Marijuana, OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG 
CONTROL POLICY, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/state-laws-related-to-marijuana. 
 2 Rep. of the Int’l Narcotics Control Bd. for 2012 UN Doc E/INCB/2012/1 at 80-83 
(2013) [hereinafter INCB 2012 Report]. 
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Relevant Background Information 
In order to appreciate the scope of the issue faced by the United States 
internationally one must first recognize and understand the various drug control 
conventions the United States is a party to. The United States is a signatory of 
three different international agreements regarding the usage of illicit drugs: the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (“SCND”), 3  the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances (“CPS”),4 and the United Nations Convention against 
the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic-Substances (“1988 UN 
Convention”).5 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) 
All of the nations that are signatories of the SCND are required to make the 
production, trade, and possession of illicit substances for non-scientific and non-
medicinal purposes a punishable offense. 6  Therefore, by permitting the 
legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington, the United States violated 
the agreement. 
The objective of the SCND is to restrict worldwide possession, usage, 
manufacturing and the trade and trafficking of drugs, with the exception of 
certain substances that are to be used for purely medical and scientific purposes.7 
The Convention classifies illicit drugs by categorizing them into four separate 
schedules based on their common usages, features and corresponding levels of 
control.8 Cannabis is classified as a Schedule I narcotic because of its addictive 
properties that are perceived as presenting a serious risk of abuse from its users.9 
It is also classified as a Schedule IV substance since it is viewed by the World 
Health Organization as a drug within Schedule I that is particularly susceptible to 
abuse and known to produce ill effects that are not offset by substantial 
therapeutic advantages.10 Schedules I and IV are acknowledged as being the most 
stringent categories and cover other drugs, including opium and coca. Ironically, 
 
 3 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 
[hereinafter Single Convention]. 
 4 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 
175 [hereinafter CPS]. 
 5 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S 95 [hereinafter 1988 UN Convention]. 
 6 JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO 
KNOW 145 (2012) [hereinafter WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW]. 
 7 See Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 4 at 4. Article 4 contains a description of the 
“general obligations” of the parties to the treaty, including “ . . . to limit exclusively to medical 
and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, 
use and possession of drugs.” Id. 
 8 Classification of Controlled Drugs, EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS AND DRUG 
ADDICTION, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index146601EN.html. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(5), at 4. Article 3(5) grants the INCB the 
power to place a drug on Schedule IV should the World Health Organization find that “a drug 
in Schedule I is particularly liable to abuse and to produce ill effects and that such liability is 
not offset by substantial therapeutic advantages not possessed by substances other than drugs 
in Schedule IV.” Id. 
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cannabis was listed Schedule IV due to pressure by the United States in the 
United Nations.11 To monitor and support all the government’s party to the treaty 
in achieving the convention’s goals, the SCND established the International 
Narcotics Control Board (“INCB”).12 
The INCB is an independent, quasi-judicial expert body that was established 
in 1968. Its members serve impartially and currently enforce the provisions of 
the SCND, the CPS and the 1988 UN Convention.13 The INCB’s duties include 
questioning governments thought to have violated treaty provisions, proposing 
remedial measures if governments are found to breach said provisions and, if 
required, assisting governments in overcoming difficulties they may be facing in 
enforcing treaty provisions.14 This requires close cooperation between the INCB 
and the governments of the nations that are signatories of the conventions it 
enforces. The INCB also publishes an annual report that outlines the yearly status 
of the international drug control system and provides recommendations to 
governments on areas of improvement in drug control.15 If the INCB discovers 
that a government has not taken the measures necessary to remedy a situation, it 
can call the matter to the attention of the parties concerned or remit the issue to 
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations’ Economic and 
Social Council.16 As a last measure, the treaties monitored by the INCB allow the 
INCB to recommend that countries stop importing and/or exporting drugs from 
the defaulting government body.17 
CPS (1971) 
The CPS was established in 1971 to address issues created by drugs that 
were not covered by the SCND. Similar to the SCND, it too aims to implement 
an international control system for the illicit substances governed by its 
 
 11 JAY SINHA, PARLIAMENT OF CANADA, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEADING 
INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL CONVENTIONS (2005), http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen
/committee/371/ille/library/history-e.htm. 
 12 See Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 5, at 4-5. Article 5 establishes the INCB as an 
“International Control Organ,” and art. 9 describes the “Composition and Function” of the 
INCB. Id. 
 13 See Mandate and Functions, International Narcotics Control Board. http://www.incb.
org/incb/en/about/mandate-functions.html. 
 14 Int’l Drug Policy Consortium [IDPC], The International Narcotics Control Board: 
Current Tensions and Options for Reform, IDPC Briefing Paper 7 (2008). 
 15 INCB Annual Report, supra note 2, at v. 
 16 See Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 14(1)(d) at 8. Article 14(1)(d) states that “If 
the Board finds that the Government concerned has failed to give satisfactory explanations 
when called upon . . . or has failed to adopt any remedial measures which it has been called 
upon to take . . . [the Board] may call the attention of the Parties, the Council and the 
Commission to the matter.” Id. 
 17 See Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 14(2), at 7. Article 14(2) grants the Board the 
power, “if it is satisfied that such a course is necessary, [to] recommend to Parties that they 
stop the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from or to the country or territory 
concerned . . . ” Id. 
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provisions. 18  Although the United States is a signatory of this international 
agreement, a further examination is unnecessary for the purposes of this Note as 
the Convention does not speak to the national or international effects of the 
legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington. 
1988 UN Convention 
The 1988 UN Convention supplements both the SCND and the CPS.19 The 
Convention aims to end international drug trafficking through the promotion of 
international cooperation between law enforcement bodies. It seeks to prevent 
illicit trafficking, to promote the arrest and trial of drug traffickers, and deprive 
drug traffickers of their profits.20 The legalization of marijuana in Colorado and 
Washington has breached the 1988 UN Convention by allowing for the 
production, distribution, sale and delivery of the illicit substance contrary to 
Article 3(1)(a) of the Convention.21 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE AT HAND 
To better understand the discrepancy in U.S. state and federal legislation a 
detailed examination of the provisions that govern the two levels of government 
is required. 
The Federal Perspective on Marijuana 
In 1970 the United States Congress introduced the Controlled Substances 
Act as a way of nationally enforcing its SCND obligations. The CSA categorizes 
all illicit substances under five schedules, with each schedule outlining the 
 
 18 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], A Century of International Drug 
Control (2008), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_
Drug_Control.pdf. 
 19 See 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. The Preamble to the 1988 UN Convention 
explains that the General Assembly of the United Nations requested the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs to hold initiate its thirty-first session to prepare a “ . . . draft convention against 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs which considers the various aspects of the problem as a whole, 
and in particular, those not envisaged in existing international instruments . . . ”. Id. 
 20 See 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5 at 9. The preamble to the articles adopted by the 
1988 Convention articulate that the “Parties to this Convention . . . recogniz[e] . . . that illicit 
traffic is an international criminal activity, the suppression of which demands urgent attention 
and the highest priority;” that the Parties are “Determined to deprive persons engaged in illicit 
traffic of the proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby eliminate their main incentive for 
doing so”; and that the Parties are “Determined to improve international co-operation in the 
suppression of illicit traffic by sea, [and] recogniz[e] that eradication of illicit traffic is a 
collective responsibility of all States and that, to that end, co-ordinated action within the 
framework of international co-operation is necessary.” Id. 
 21 See 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5, art. 3(1)(a), at 12. Article 3(1)(a) of the 1988 
UN Convention requires that “Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally: the 
production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, 
delivery on any terms whatsoever . . . of any drug or any psychotropic substance contrary to 
the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended, or the 1971 
Convention.” Id. Marijuana is listed as one such substance under both Schedule I and Schedule 
IV of the Single Convention, supra note 3, at 26. 
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varying degrees of a drug’s potential abuse and its acceptance for medical use in 
treatment.22 Marijuana is considered part of the Schedule I substance category23 
which means it has a high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use in the 
United States, and that there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug under 
medical supervision.24 Penalty provisions outlined under section 841 of the CSA 
criminalize marijuana possession, with imprisonment terms ranging from five 
years to life depending on the various factors outlined in the Act.25 Despite 
changes in multiple state provisions regarding the legalization of medical 
marijuana26, and the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana27, current 
CSA provisions continue to categorize cannabis as a Schedule I substance and 
criminalize its possession. 
The State Perspective on Marijuana 
In the United States marijuana is currently decriminalized in eighteen states, 
medical marijuana is legalized in twenty-three states28 and recreational marijuana 
is legalized in the states of Alaska, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Colorado 
and Washington.29 While specifics vary from state to state, the decriminalization 
of marijuana differs from current CSA provisions by not subjecting persons 
found in possession of small amounts of marijuana to criminal records.30 States 
that have decriminalized marijuana can still impose state regulatory laws and 
civil fines on persons found in possession of the substance. Conversely, while 
laws differ based on jurisdiction, legalizing marijuana removes most legal 
ramifications associated with usage of the substance. 31  While particulars of 
legislation detailing legalization differ between Colorado and Washington, both 
states have implemented similar regulatory schemes regarding the usage, 
possession and sale of marijuana. Since the focus of this Note is on the 
legalization of marijuana, it will strictly focus on the state laws of Washington 
and Colorado, the first government entities in the world to legalize marijuana.32 
Both Colorado and Washington decided to reform their previous provisions 
on marijuana for three reasons: public health and safety, elimination of black 
 
 22 CSA 21 U.S.C. § 811(c). 
 23 CSA 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule I. 
 24 CSA 21 U.S.C. § 812 (b)(1). 
 25 CSA 21 U.S.C § 841 (2012). 
 26 LISA N. SACCO & KRISTIN FINLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43164, STATE 
LEGALIZATION INITIATIVES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (2014) 
(stating that over half the states and the District of Columbia have allowed for the use of 
medical marijuana) [hereinafter STATE LEGALIZATION INITIATIVES]. 
 27 Id. at 5. 
 28 State Medical Marijuana Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 
29, 2015) http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx. 
 29 Marijuana Overview NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 23, 2014) 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx. 
 30 STATE LEGALIZATION INITIATIVES, supra note 26, at 5. 
 31 Id. 
 32 A Liberal Drift, supra note 1. 
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market sales and increasing overall tax revenue.33  From a public health and 
safety perspective, both states found previous marijuana regulatory laws to be an 
inefficient use of law enforcement resources that could be better utilized by 
targeting violent crimes instead. The states also determined that legalizing 
marijuana by taxing it heavily would result in a decrease in black market sales 
and an increase in tax revenue, thereby increasing funding for government social 
assistance programs. 
Washington I-502 
Washington reformed its legislation through the introduction of Washington 
Initiative 502 (I-502), which took effect on November 6, 2012 when the 
legalization of marijuana was authorized by popular vote. 34 
The I-502 gives the Washington State Liquor Control Board (“WSLCB”) 
authority to grant licenses to three tiers of marijuana distribution sectors: 
producers, processors and retailers. 35  Washington has mandated that all 
recreational marijuana be purchased through a licensed retailer and that non-
licensed persons are not permitted to grow, produce or sell their own marijuana. 
In order to be considered for a recreational marijuana license, the party applying 
must have been a Washington resident for at least two years.36 However, non-
Washington residents will be permitted to purchase a small amount of marijuana 
for recreational use while in Washington. The general public can purchase 
recreational marijuana in limited quantities and, similar to alcohol consumption, 
the use of marijuana must be limited from public view.37 I-502 also implemented 
a twenty-five percent excise tax to be compounded at each tier of the marijuana 
supply chain on which consumers are expected to pay additional sales tax. 
Current calculations estimate revenue generated within the first five years of the 
introduction of recreational marijuana to reach two-billion dollars (USD).38 
Colorado Amendment 64 
Like the I-502, Colorado introduced Amendment 64 as a ballot initiative to 
modify the statewide drug policy concerning cannabis. Now part of Article 18, 
section 16 of the Colorado State Constitution, the amended law closely mimics 
that of I-502. Major similarities include the three tier supply chain system, the 
tax rate compounding on each tier of the supply chain with an additional sales 
 
 33 Matt Ferner, Why Marijuana Should Be Legalized: ‘Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol’ 
Campaign Discusses Why Pot Prohibition Has Been A Failure, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 28, 
2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/28/why-marijuana-should-be-legalized_n_1833
751.html. 
 34 Matt Sledge, Colorado, Washington Pot Legalization Deals Drug War Major Blow, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/colorado-was
hington-pot-legalization-_n_2086023.html. 
 35 See, e.g., Sedro-Wooley, Oregon Ordinance 1789-14 (Feb. 17, 2014). Recitals to Sedro-
Wooley City Ordinance stating that WSLCB began accepting applications for 1-502 licenses 
on November 18, 2013. Retail sales of marijuana for recreational purposes began in 2014. 
 36 See Washington State Liquor Control Board, FAQs on I-502: Public Safety/Criminal, 
http://www.liq.wa.gov/marijuana/faqs_i-502. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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tax for the end consumer 39 , and oversight of the Colorado state marijuana 
regulatory system by the state liquor control board. 
The Federal Response 
Although there is an evident disparity between the recreational marijuana 
initiatives passed in Washington and Colorado and federal CSA legislation, 
President Obama has stated that the federal government has “bigger fish to fry,” 
implying that pursuing marijuana users was not a priority for the federal 
Department of Justice (DOJ). 40  Thus, the federal DOJ’s response to the 
legalization of marijuana in Washington and Colorado has been to not challenge 
state laws based on the condition that states will “implement strong and effective 
regulatory and enforcement systems.”41 The DOJ has also reserved its right to 
file a lawsuit at a later date since the states’ regulation of marijuana is still 
considered illegal under the CSA.42 
While the DOJ has left the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and 
Washington unchallenged, federal prosecution relating to the use of marijuana 
will still be strictly enforced in eight scenarios. These eight high-priority areas 
include: the distribution of marijuana to minors; revenue from the sale of 
marijuana going to a criminal enterprise; diversion of marijuana from states 
where it is legal to states where it is considered illegal; state-authorized 
marijuana activity used as a cover for the trafficking of other illegal activity; 
violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana; 
drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public health 
consequences associated with marijuana use; growing of marijuana on public 
lands and the attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by 
marijuana production on public lands; and preventing marijuana possession or 
use on federal property. 43  However, should the DOJ determine that “state 
enforcement efforts are not sufficiently robust,” it has the authority to shut down 
state-licensed growers and retailers.44 
Although the federal government has permitted state regulation of 
recreational marijuana, a major point of contention does exist. Since marijuana 
remains illegal under federal law, banks are prohibited from handling profits 
 
 39 Joseph Henchman, Taxing Marijuana: The Washington and Colorado Experience, TAX 
FOUNDATION FISCAL FACT no. 437 at 1 (Aug. 2014) (Explaining that Colorado differs from 
Washington in that there is a 15% excise tax on each tier with sales tax being 10%). 
 40 Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says DOJ Will Let Washington, Colorado 
Marijuana Laws Go Into Effect, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2013/08/29/eric-holder-marijuana-washington-colorado-doj_n_3837034.html [hereinafter  
Holder]. 
 41 Evan Perez, No Federal Challenge to Pot Legalization in Two States, CNN (Aug. 30, 
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/politics/holder-marijuana-laws/. 
 42 Sarah Kliff, Justice Dept. Won’t Stop States from Legalizing Pot. Here’s What That 
Means, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog
/wp/2013/08/29/justice-dept-wont-stop-states-from-legalizing-pot-heres-what-that-means/. 
 43 Eric Holder, supra note 40. 
 44 Jacob Sullum, Justice Department Gives Yellow Light to Marijuana Legalization, 
FORBES (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2013/08/29/justice-depart
ment-gives-yellow-light-to-marijuana-legalization/. 
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from marijuana sales due to anti-money-laundering rules. 45  This means that 
marijuana shops will be unable to use basic banking services, such as checking 
and savings accounts, making everyday business transactions nearly impossible. 
III. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
By allowing the legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and 
Washington, the United States goes against the mandate of both the SCND46 and 
the 1988 UN Convention.47 This results in problems on an international front. 
International Response 
In its annual report the INCB directly responded to the legalization of 
marijuana in Colorado and Washington by explicitly stating: “the board reiterates 
that the legalization of cannabis for non-medical, non-scientific purposes would 
be in contravention to provisions of the 1961 convention as amended by 1972 
protocol.”48 In its overall recommendations the same report specifically drew 
attention to the United States, urging the federal government to take the 
“necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the international drug 
control treaties on its entire territory.”49 
Other than brief mention in the 2012 INCB report, the United States has not 
faced international backlash regarding its disregard of the SCND50 and 1988 UN 
Convention 51  provisions. Regarded as the current world superpower and an 
advocate of international cooperation, the United States should proactively 
reconcile the differences in its federal legislation and the international 
agreements it is party to in order to avoid negative criticisms.52 Also, as a pioneer 
in the field of marijuana legalization, many nations will look to the United States 
for direction regarding future marijuana regulation. 
Although amongst the first in its field, the United States should attempt to 
learn from other nations that have implemented recreational marijuana regulatory 
measures to determine which route it should take in meeting its national and 
international obligations. To determine the best course of action for the United 
States to take in ensuring compliance with the SCND 53  and the 1988 UN 
Convention, 54  this Note analyzes three countries which have developed 
recreational marijuana regulatory policies: the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
 
 45 David Ingram, U.S. May Help Marijuana Shops Get Banking Services, REUTERS (Sept. 
10, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/10/us-usa-crime-marijuana-idUSBRE9891
EK20130910. 
 46 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 47 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
 48 INCB Annual Report, supra note 2, at 63. 
 49 Id. at 116. 
 50 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 51 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
 52 Robert Kagan, A Changing World Order? WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/-opinions/a-changing-world-order/2013/11/15/4ce39d1a-489
a-11e3-b6f8-3782ff6cb769_story.html. 
 53 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 54 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
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While North Korea has also legalized marijuana, it is not an appropriate country 
to study since its international obligations differ vastly from that of the United 
States.55 
IV. COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
A. The Netherlands 
While the Dutch have not legalized recreational marijuana, they have 
decriminalized it. The Netherlands differs from other government states that have 
decriminalized marijuana because of its coffee-shop policy. The policy allows 
the sale of a limited quantity of marijuana per person per day in coffee shops that 
are strictly regulated by government agencies.56 While this may seem contrary to 
SCND 57  objectives, the Dutch federal legislation meets its international 
requirements as it has a clause stating that the production, trafficking and 
possession of marijuana are punishable offences. However, since the SCND58 
does not contain clauses which “concern the actual enforcement of the 
legislation”, the coffee shop policy is not in contravention of the SCND.59,60 Best 
stated by former Chief of Demand Reduction for the UN Drug Control 
Programme Cindy Fazey, “the Conventions say that there must be an offence 
under domestic criminal law, it does not say that the law has to be enforced, or 
that when it is what sanctions should apply . . . ” 61  When the 1988 UN 
Convention62 pressured countries to criminalize the possession of marijuana, the 
Netherlands chose to ratify the provision “with reservation,” allowing the Dutch 
to be part of the 1988 Convention but not be required to adhere to that specific 
condition. Thus, the Dutch have been able to successfully allow for the sale and 
possession of small amounts of marijuana while maintaining their international 
agreements. 
A major flaw with current Dutch law governing marijuana arises as a result 
of the Dutch government strictly enforcing laws against the growing and 
wholesaling of cannabis, making the production of marijuana illegal. Although 
allowed up to five cannabis plants per person, this supply limitation does not 
meet the needs of Dutch coffee shops. Therefore, by allowing people to buy and 
sell a substance which cannot be legally produced in sufficient quantity to meet 
market needs, the Dutch government is inadvertently promoting the use of a 
black market. The government is essentially forcing coffee shop owners to 
interact with criminals since there is no legal way for business owners to obtain 
 
 55 Adam Taylor, North Korea Has A Surprising Attitude To Marijuana, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Jan. 15, 2013, 8 p.m.), http://www.businessinsider.com/north-koreas-and-marijuana-2013-1. 
 56 Dutch Drug Policy, http://www.holland.com/us/tourism/article/dutch-drug-policy.htm. 
 57 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 58 Id. 
 59 WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW, supra note 6 at 147. 
 60 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 61 David Bewley-Taylor & Cindy Fazey, The Mechanics and Dynamics of the UN System 
for International Drug Control, FORWARD THINKING ON DRUGS (March 14, 2003), 
http://www.forward-thinking-on-drugs.org/review1.html. 
 62 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
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greater than 5g of marijuana.63 When questioned about this evident failing in 
regulatory policy, the former Dutch Minister of Health, Hedy D’Ancona, stated 
that the government was “already so happy with what [it] had, that [it] did not 
realize which problems [it] was also getting.”64 
B. Portugal 
Like the Netherlands, Portugal too decriminalized the use of recreational 
marijuana. However, Portugal went one step further and in addition to 
decriminalizing marijuana, it also decriminalized all other illicit substances. The 
new law, which came into effect in 2001, was a government strategy focused on 
encouraging drug abusers to seek treatment instead of punishing them.65 While 
the sale and trafficking of illegal drugs still mandates criminal conviction, the 
new law, in principle, trumped 1988 UN Convention 66  provisions which 
encouraged criminalization of the use and possession of illicit substances, since 
the law made use and possession of up to ten days worth of a drug an 
administrative offence instead of a criminal offence. 67  However, the United 
Nations cannot speak against the Portugal’s actions of decriminalizing all illicit 
substances as Article 3(2) of the 1988 UN Convention68 states that all measures 
adopted by a signatory state are “subject to [domestic] constitutional principles 
and the basic concepts of [domestic] legal systems.”69 Therefore, Portugal can 
adopt a modest punitive criminal justice approach to drug possession without 
breaching its international obligations. 70 
Ten years after the law on decriminalization of illicit drugs was passed, 
Portugal has seen a significant improvement in the country’s drug problems.71 
Portugal is unique in the sense that it did not implement decriminalization as a 
way to combat an increase in public usage of cannabis but rather, aimed to 
provide treatment to those individuals that need it most. As stated by Mr. 
Goulao, President of the Portuguese Drug Institute, in removing the “fear and 
stigma” of criminal punishment drug users are encouraged to seek the help they 
 
 63 Dutch Coffee Shop Fined 10m Euros for Breaking Drug Law, BBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8587576.stm. 
 64 JEAN-PAUL GRUND & JOOST BREEKSMA, COFFEE SHOPS AND COMPROMISE 31 (2013). 
 65 Portugal Legalises Drug Use, BBC NEWS (July 7, 2000), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/823257.stm. 
 66 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
 67 EMCDDA, Drug Policy Profiles: Portugal, EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE FOR 
DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION (June 2011), http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/drug-
policy-profiles/portugal. 
 68 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Steve Rolles & Niamh Eastwood, Drug Decriminalisation Policies in Practice: A 
Global Summary, TRANSFERM DRUG POLICY FOUNDATION (2009), 
http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/drug-decriminalisation-policies-practice-global-
summary. 
 71 Since 2001 cases involving heroin dropped from 33% to 13% in 2008. See id., p. 1004. 
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need.72 It was with the intent of improving public health that Portugal decided to 
change its drug policy. 
C. Spain 
Current Spanish law does not criminalize the possession of marijuana, but 
does criminalize its sale.73 This regulatory system has resulted in the emergence 
of cannabis “social clubs” (CSC’s), which are non-commercial entities with the 
objective of providing its members with enough cannabis to meet their personal 
needs. First established in 2002, these not-for-profit entities have various benefits 
which include providing members a certain standard of quality marijuana,74 an 
alternative to the unregulated marijuana black market, accountability, and job 
creation. Membership can either be acquired through invitation by two pre-
existing members who are willing to guarantee that the party wishing to join is a 
cannabis consumer or through presentation of a medical report which confirms 
that the person has an illness for which cannabis use is recommended. Members 
are not allowed to sell cannabis nor distribute it to minors. Spanish common law 
has established that the possession of large quantities of cannabis does not 
constitute a crime unless is done for the purpose for trafficking.75 This makes it 
legally permissible for clubs to possess large amounts of cannabis at any one 
time. 
As a signatory of both the SCND76 and the 1988 UN Convention,77 Spanish 
drug practices are still in compliance with both conventions’ requirements. This 
is because Article 36 of the SCND78, which includes “possession” in its list of 
punishable offences, has been internationally interpreted as possession for the 
purpose of trafficking, not as possession for personal consumption. The 1988 UN 
Convention79 interprets personal consumption as a form of possession and urges 
state signatories to make all forms of possession a criminal offence. However, 
this resulted in much controversy and thus, as stated earlier, 1988 UN 
Convention80 defers to the domestic law of a party state in providing that all 
offences are to be prosecuted and punished in conformity with domestic law 
under Article 3(2). 81  Furthermore, the European Union has permitted the 
cultivation of marijuana for personal use under Article 2.2 of the Council’s 
 
 72 Towards a Ceasefire, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 23, 2013) http://www.economist.com/news
/international/21572184-experiments-legalisation-are-showing-what-post-war-approach-drug-
control-could-look. 
 73 Id. 
 74 The Global Initiative for Drug Policy Reform: Spain, BECKLEY FOUNDATION, 
http://reformdrugpolicy.com/-beckley-main-content/new-approaches/future-directions-for-
drug-policy-reform/spain/. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 77 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
 78 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 79 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
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Framework Decision, thus strengthening the clout of the Spanish government’s 
marijuana provisions.82 
V. VIABLE ALTERNATIVES 
Since the United States’ national policy is currently in conflict with both the 
SCND 83  and the 1988 UN Convention, 84  it must find a way to resolve the 
discrepancies in order to meet its international commitments. However, one must 
also consider whether international conventions dating back to 1961 have 
become outdated and ineffective in regulating drug use, thus making them 
impractical. Outlined below are the viable alternatives available to the United 
States in fulfilling its international obligations and the potential actions available 
to the United Nations should the United States not fulfil its requirements. 
Alternatives available to the United States 
1. Meet International Requirements 
In attempts to abide by the international agreements it is a party to, the 
United States could enforce its federal legislation regarding marijuana usage by 
overriding the legalization of marijuana in Washington and Colorado. However, 
this would likely result in backlash from both the citizens of the states and the 
state government bodies. The backlash would result in exponential growth of the 
marijuana black market, leading to an increase in police regulation and resulting 
in a greater expenditure of tax payer dollars on enforcement. 
2. Withdraw from International Conventions 
The United States could take the polar opposite route of complete 
conformity by withdrawing from the international agreements pertaining to 
marijuana regulation in accordance with Article 46 of the SCND85 and Article 30 
of the 1988 UN Convention.86 Such a course of action would likely result in 
international condemnation and could, in extreme cases, trigger the international 
community to withdraw from economically associating with the country. 
However, since the United States is the world superpower, other countries would 
be less incentivized to express their disapproval given most nations’ economic, 
social and political reliance upon the United States. 
3. Denounce, then Re-ratify with Reservation 
Although an unconventional route and not one that is necessarily viewed 
upon favourably, the United States could denounce (i.e. withdraw) from the 1988 
UN Convention 87  and then, like Netherlands, join the agreement with 
 
 82 Martin Alonso, Cannabis social clubs in Spain, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE at 4 (Jan. 
2011), http://druglawreform.info/en/about-us/in-the-media/item/2595-drug-club-spains-
alternative-cannabis-economy. 
 83 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 84 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
 85 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 86 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
 87 Id. 
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“reservation” on the provisions concerning the use of marijuana. Should the U.N. 
conclude that the United States is violating the SCND,88 then the United States 
could use the case of the Netherlands as an example. Since the Netherlands has a 
law on the books stating that trafficking and possessing marijuana is illegal, it 
has met the technical requirements of the Convention even though it does not 
enforce its legislation to the extent desired by the UN. However, as noted by the 
Netherlands government, since the SCND 89  does not stipulate enforcement 
provisions of its laws, the United States would not be in violation of any 
requirements either. 
While this alternative essentially discredits the SCND90 and the 1988 UN 
Conventions’91 since it allows countries to pick and choose which provisions to 
abide by, it remains a valid alternative.92 Some nations could argue that by re-
ratifying with a reservation for clauses regarding marijuana provisions, the 
United States would violate the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties93 
since its actions would be “incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty” under VCLT Article 19.94 However, as the world superpower, the United 
States would likely have few nations speak against its actions. 
Course of Action available to International Bodies 
Since no country has ever been found to have violated international drug 
control treaties, there is no precedent or formula for the United Nations to follow 
in response to the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington. Thus, 
whichever action the United Nations chooses in this case will set a precedent for 
the international community. 
1. International Court of Justice 
While neither the SCND95 nor the 1988 UN Convention96 specify a penalty 
for provision violators, SCND Article 48 does state that if a dispute arises 
regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention, then a nation can 
be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).97 The ICJ was established 
by the United Nations in 1946 with the objective of settling, in accordance with 
international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory 
 
 88 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
 92 International Narcotics Control Board, Statement by Mr. Raymond Yans, President, 
International Narcotics Control Board, U.N. Doc E/incb/2012/1 (2013). 
 93 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is widely recognized as the authoritative 
guide regarding the formation and effects of treaties. It codifies several principles of 
contemporary international law related to treaties. 
 94 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Vienna 
Convention. 
 95 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 96 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
 97 WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW, supra note 6, at 148. 
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opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs 
and specialized agencies.98 
While the ICJ can render a decision, its decisions are not enforceable without 
the assistance of the U.N. Security Council. Therefore, should the United States 
choose not to abide by the decision of the ICJ there would be no direct 
repercussion for not doing so. Indirect consequences may take the form of the 
international community’s disapproval of the nation’s actions, but because of the 
strength of the United States, this disapproval would likely be limited. 
Conversely, a refusal by the United States to act on an ICJ decision could 
discredit the ICJ as a legitimate source of authority for future issues. In any 
event, the United States is one of five permanent members of the U.N. Security 
Council and, as such, has a veto over any enforcement actions contemplated. 
Thus, the United Nations should be wary in referring this issue to the ICJ. 
2. Public Rebuke 
Public rebuke covers a wide spectrum of potential actions. The INCB has 
already publicly rebuked the United States, specifically the states of Colorado 
and Washington, in its annual report. The INCB’s statements, which were 
printed in U.S. newspapers, do not seem to have resulted in any proactive action 
by the United States federal government. Raymond Yans, President of the INCB, 
stated that by violating the SCND,99 the United States has “[undermined] the 
humanitarian aims of the drug-control system and are a threat to public health 
and well being of society far beyond those states.”100 
Should the international community feel strongly enough about the United 
States violating convention provisions, it could choose to invoke economic 
sanctions against the nation. However, as stated, since the United States is a 
world power, this scenario seems extremely unlikely. 
3. Amend the Requirements of the Affected Conventions 
Any party can amend the SCND 101  under Article 47 and the 1988 UN 
Convention102 under Article 31. Amendment provisions in both conventions fall 
in line with Articles 39 and 40 of the Vienna Convention.103 While not often 
done, if the United States can meet the stipulations required of it or if the United 
Nations determines that an appropriate number of state parties are amenable to 
amending the provisions in question, then the legalization of recreational 
 
 98 The International Court of Justice is the pre-eminent judicial organ of the United 
Nations. The Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes 
submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by 
authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies. In some instances its jurisdiction is 
compulsory, in others it is consensual. 
 99 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 100 United Nations Information Service, INCB President Voices Concern About the 
Outcome of Recent Referenda about Non-Medical use of Cannabis in the United States in a 
number of states, United Nations Information Service, UNIS/NAR/1153 (Nov. 15, 2012). 
 101 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 102 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
 103 Vienna Convention, supra note 94. 
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marijuana could be accommodated. This would result in a significant change to 
the international drug landscape, resulting in various countries reconsidering the 
provisions governing recreational marijuana in their domestic jurisdiction. 
VI. SUMMARY 
Currently, the United Nations risks its reputation as an international 
regulatory body since other nations may view the United States’ breach of treaty 
provisions as an acceptable form of conduct. This taint in reputation could 
potentially result in other nations breaching their United Nations treaty 
commitments. Thus, it would be in the best interests of both the United Nations 
and the United States to resolve their differences regarding the usage of 
marijuana. Through an analysis of the SCND,104 the 1988 UN Convention,105 
current federal and state perspectives regarding recreational marijuana in the 
United States, and a summary of three countries which have implemented 
marijuana regulations in their domestic state, this report has set forth the viable 
alternatives available to both bodies in reconciling their differences. Conversely, 
the United States risks international condemnation for violating its duties under 
the international agreements it is party to. Regardless of which route is ultimately 
taken, benefit is most likely to be had through mutual agreement. 
 
 104 Single Convention, supra note 3. 
 105 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. 
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